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Are ethics practical when externals impact your
clinical judgment?
James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA, and Laurence B. McCullough, PhD, Houston, TexEvery man is a damn fool for at least five minutes every day.
Wisdom consists in not exceeding that limit.
Elbert Hubbard
You were somewhat flattered when the foremost
donor to the hospital where you practice consulted you
6 months ago for an infrarenal aneurysm. He is 85
years of age and has enjoyed fully his leisurely lifestyle.
In the interim he has pledged to fund a much needed
hospital children’s wing. The aneurysm measured 4 cm
then. When he came in for a 6 months’ checkup, the
same equipment was used to measure and the aneurysm
remained exactly the same. Both he and his wife are
adamant that their lives have been tormented continu-
ally by the presence of a “weak spot that could rupture
and kill him.” Your citations of data, reassurances, and
pleadings for reason were unheeded. You agreed to fix it.
The hospital administrator and chief-of-staff called to
congratulate. The preoperative workup had no imposing
data to rethink operating and children and influential
friends have flown in to be attentive. But you continued
to be troubled. What should be done?
A. Do the procedure. You agreed.
B. Get called out of town for a family emergency and have
one of the equally experienced colleagues who congrat-
ulated you do the procedure.
C. Do the procedure. A generation of patients will benefit
from the new hospital wing.
D. Do the procedure. The emotional suffering of that
elderly couple makes up for the slight disadvantage of a
tilted risk/benefit.
E. Don’t do the procedure. Your integrity depends on
objectively practicing evidence-based medicine.
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1282In a modern medical environment, high-profile physi-
cians encounter all kinds of external pressures; there always
have been. Political pressures about what to do or say draws
on time and energy, and special patients with claims or
special requests make an elite practice “interesting.” In
contrast to the interesting cases of medical students, to
experienced surgeons the designation “interesting” usually
euphemistically means an association with sphincter tetany.
In this case, the interesting portion is ethical not medical.
Major vascular surgery has accomplishedmiracles in the
last half of the preceding century but those procedures
remain attended by horrific complications. It is therefore
important to be certain that the risk-benefit ratio for each
patient is clearly beneficial. Otherwise, the surgeon’s benef-
icence-based obligation to protect the health and life of the
patient is violated. Professional integrity prohibits such
violations. Externalities, such as the hospital’s quite legiti-
mate self-interest in securing funding for its expansion, do
not override this integrity-based ethical prohibition.
Maintenance of professional integrity and the protec-
tion of patients from clinically unnecessary and, especially,
unnecessary and potentially harmful interventions provides
the basis of patients’ trust. Patients who are considering
major operations have a great deal of trust, frequently
unreasonable, in what their surgeon can do and what their
outcome will be.1 The physician is and should remain
someone worthy of intellectual trust—to practice medicine
to evidence-based standards—and moral trust—not to al-
low matters of individual or organizational self-interest,
however legitimate, to distort or undermine adherence to
those standards.
Because vascular surgeons are conclusive referral spe-
cialists, they are less likely to receive patient’s requests for
tests or procedures, but the era of patient participation in
their medical care is upon us. Kravitz2 noted 5 years ago
that one third of patients requested specific tests or proce-
dures and 9.6% of physicians complied. Another study
determined that when physicians were confronted with
requests for unindicated magnetic resonance imaging
scans, 8% ordered the expensive tests, 22% stated they
would order them in the near future, and 53% ducked the
issue with a pointless referral to a neurologist.
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cates, insurance payors, national medical organizations, and
a growing number of ethicists have hopped on the auton-
omy bandwagon and increasingly insist that patients should
not only be accurately informed and participate in decision-
making about their treatment but should also be deciding
their therapy. The pharmaceutical industry recognizes the
emergence of “power to the patient” by peppering the
airways with enticements pressuring patients to pester phy-
sicians for life-enhancing supplementary drugs that do not
treat diseases. They legitimize these ads by providing a
mini-medical education, including contraindications and
side effects that patients generally ignore or may even find
desirable. What impotent lay male, when warned about
erections lasting 4 hours, would not confuse satyriasis
(good) with priapism (bad) unless told that his penis could
thrombose and require amputation. Talk about polyse-
mous advertising!
More than a decade ago, Pellegrino3 cautioned that
undue enthusiasm for patient rights could be harmful to
their health, when he warned:
In the last 25 years, patient autonomy has displaced
physician beneficence as a dominant principle in medical
ethics. This has enhanced the moral right of patients to
refuse unwanted treatment and to participate in clinical
decisions. But now, in some cases, patient autonomy is
being absolutized. The right to refuse is becoming a right
to demand treatment. The result is danger to the moral
and professional integrity of physicians. A reassessment of
the mutual moral obligations of physicians and patients to
respect each other’s autonomy is in order.3
That reassessment has involved making the distinction
between negative and positive rights. A negative right is the
right to be left alone. Negative rights shape the informed
consent process. Once the physician has presented the adult,
competent patient (and all adults are presumed to be compe-
tent) with the medically reasonable alternatives for the clinical
management of the patient’s condition, the patient has the
right to select one of them or the right to reject some or all.
Positive rights differ. A positive right includes the right to
identify for oneself what clinical management is reasonable
and then request it. Because they place no or little demand on
the resources of others, negative rights have noor onlymodest
limits. By contrast, positive rights do place demands on the
resources of others. Positive rights always come with limits.
The ethics of positive rights concerns what those limits are,
not whether they exist in the first place.4
The distinction between positive and negative rights
may be lost on some patients. Physicians, however, should
never lose sight of the distinction, lest they prefer to aban-
don professional integrity and become mere technicians of
medical knowledge and its clinical application.
In this context, it is crucial to appreciate that when one
grants the right for a patient to direct their own therapy,
recognition must be given to the fact that the patient’s
values may directly conflict with the physician’s values.5Evidence-based practice of medicine cannot be understoodcompletely, much less mastered to proficiency, by a highly
intelligent layperson querying the Internet. Were you to
explain the disease and therapy using advanced technical
terminology to such a patient, their understanding would
be the equivalent of showing card tricks to a dog.
Beneficence-based surgical judgment is the linchpin of
surgical therapy, absent which deficits accrue that technical
skills cannot overcome. A perfectly performed unnecessary
procedure remains unnecessary. The extent to which the
patient’s autonomy allows modification of the surgeon’s
best judgment soon becomes paradoxical, wherein some-
thing good chances becoming bad. Surgical judgment thus
must be mindful of when respect for autonomy has gone
too far and trodden beneficence must kick back in. That
point is reached when the patient asserts positive rights to
treatment for which there is no adequate evidence base and
that is potentially harmful. Because then providing such
intervention violates beneficence-based obligations to the
patient and therefore professional integrity.
Recommendations for treating abdominal aneurysms
are current and devised by respected authorities who have
evaluated the available evidence.6 Our patient’s disease is
less severe than the authoritative recommended threshold
for repair, and his advanced age, along with follow-up
evidence of disease stability, provides a foundation for our
surgeon’s rethinking his decision to operate. The recom-
mendation of the Joint Vascular Council’s subcommittee
includes considering the patient’s preference in the decision
to operate or monitor, but one may assume the patient’s
positive rights apply to borderline cases and do not trump
unfavorable risk-benefit ratios.
Excellence in the practice of evidence-based medicine
requires a continuous readjustment of decisions as data
input changes. Rethinking decisions becomes absurd unless
one includes willingness to alter previous conclusions.
Changing the decision to operate will be embarrassing for
the surgeon and inconvenient for the patient and his family.
But is doing an operation for what one has decided is the
wrong reason less important? One would suspect that the
ego strength of our surgeon would suffice; the ego appears
the most regenerable part of the human psyche. Option A
cannot be considered correct.
Getting another willing surgeon to take over a Jeho-
vah’s Witness case is ethically acceptable, why not this case?
As the responsible surgeon, you cannot disregard the fact
that by making arrangements for the procedure, you will
still be responsible for an unindicated procedure being
done.7 Should you refuse and the patient seek another
surgeon himself, you would not be at fault.
Option B has entertainment value and we have heard it
mentioned as such by students in our teaching of cases like
this. Option C has no legitimate palace in the decision-
making, inasmuch as it represents a transparent failure of
professional integrity. Utilitarianism by definition slights
the physician’s ethical duty to patients by placing emphasis
on the “greatest number”. D as a choice is insufficient to
validate the performance of the operation and should be
dealt with by a careful explanation of the relative risks, a
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and psychologic reassurance of closer follow-up. The same
is the case for option A.
The remaining choice E is to cancel the procedure and
is the ethically correct one. It is difficult indeed to disregard
worldly importance and not allow it to influence our clinical
decisions, but it matters not whether bad judgment arises
from insufficiency of knowledge or unwarranted influences,
it pollutes all the same.
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